

TRANSCRIPTION - ORIGINAL FOLLOWS

Recommendation: [3 lines illeg]
MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL TAYLOR

SUBJECT: Meeting of Berlin Steering Group, 15 August 1961.

1. Military Contingency Planning

A. What is agreed U.S. position, if any?

Nitze paper taken to Paris is the key, Kohler wanted to table it. Alexis Johnson back here resisted. Kohler persisted, cabled request for approval of text revised over there by agreement between Nitze and Dave Gray. Received approval: Tabled as a U.S. paper. UK-French are studying at government level. Don't like it.

On the theory that Kohler carried the Interdepartmental Coordinating Group under his hat to Paris (a theory you resisted), the paper may be said to have received working-level U.S. concurrences over there. The only approval of which I am aware back here was State's, and I really doubt if Rusk himself got into it much. Certainly your Steering Group, as such, never had a crack at it, and I don't believe the President really has a clue about it, although he may have read some of the confusing cable traffic.

File

Pariseroperamt. Date and S.D. which reflecs 13 August 1961.
Instruction of co-operation for military and diplomatic to cover all the
guidelines in the North-American paper. Where to implement these
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1. **Military Contingency Planning**

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13C/PK

... ~~anyway~~ ~~anyway~~ conditions ... to get ready for any
action which is reasonably.

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Recommendation: That the U.S. press relentlessly and with no indication of compromise for authorizing planning to cover all the guidelines in the Nitze-Gray U.S. paper. Where to accomplish this? Next question.

b. What is the status of 3-ite or 4-ite Berlin military contingency planning?

On the whole, my answer is that it rests at [word excised] level. When it gets jammed up there, appeals are made to governments, and nothing happens. The so-called Washington Ambassadorial Group looks as if it will win the nomination for Allied planning in preparation for East-West negotiations. Whatever the doubtful merits of that imminent decision, it is a lousy forum for any consideration of military contingency planning.

Recommendation: That a US-UK-French-German special board of senior general officers be ordered to come up with their agreed plans or their dissents by a given date -- say 15 September. Meet in Paris, where [words excised] staff will be available and where Norstad is also available. Officers would be accredited by highest joint levels in their countries, with direct access to those levels for instructions. Each officer to have a political adviser.

2. "Modalities of Access!"

This euphemism really means that whoever is using it certainly believes in letting the East Germans stamp access documents, probably believes in letting East Germans and West Germans work out arrangements for Allied access, and may believe in de facto recognition of the DDR. It is a verbal shield against Dean Acheson's wrathful bolts.

This is the "wave of the future" around here. I am all for it, and I believe your threshold for casi bellorum is pretty high also.

Recommendation: Leave the advocacy to others, but support this general view.

3. Imposition of Eastern Travel Controls

Nobody wants to go to war, I assume, over this recent business, but everyone hopes somebody else will come up with an impressive and effective countermeasure. I forget who it was who said: "If God did not exist, we should have to invent him" but the same line applies to the way these controls have shut off the refugees. 99% of these refugees have not been seeking legitimate political asylum or freedom from real oppression; they have been seeking a better shake economically.

Recommendation: That the U.S. press relentlessly and with no indication of compromise for authorising planning to cover all the guidelines in the Nitze-drey U.S. paper. Where to accomplish this - Next question. What are the West Germans doing about it? In the event of the failure of the negotiations, what is the alternative? e.g. What is the status of 3-ite or 4-ite Berlin military contingency planning?

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Recommendation: Support Bundy's position. If countermeasures receive strong support, keep them within travel and economic fields (trade restrictions up to perhaps embargo), and let the West Germans blaze the trail. Don't lose sight of the object of our impending exercise in brinkmanship: the preservation of the security and freedom of West Berlin. Everything else is tangential.

4. Acheson's Six Stages

Acheson's first plan steamrolled everything and everyone; it just about became the policy of the United States faute de mieux. Once again a sharp edged plan of his has hit the table. This time let's treat it as the grapefruit course, not the main course. Henry Kissinger once wrote something to the effect that in a conceptual vacuum the man with strong conviction will prevail every time. What some of these people around here approach as a post-doctoral seminar or a "skull session" is a court of Last Judgement to old Acheson.

Recommendation: Direct the Interdepartmental Coordinating Group to address itself to the Acheson's six-stage plan, so as to come up with a sharp report on it in about ten days, with the idea that the plan and the ICG's report thereon would then be considered by the Steering Group as a scheduled matter. Since Acheson's broad sweep apparently include some matters of negotiation substance, recommend that, for the purpose of this initial ICG study, this substance be excised and considered separately, probably later.

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